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Abstract
Across three experiments, I investigated the role of recollection rejection in rejecting
false suggestions using the misinformation paradigm. The use of model-based measurement of
recollection rejection was extended to the misinformation paradigm. I manipulated two factors,
delay and feedback, that are known to influence the use of recollection rejection. Recollection
rejection was used to reject false suggestions in the misinformation paradigm. Manipulating
delay time did not affect the acceptance of misinformation or the use of recollection rejection.
Warning participants about false information reduced misinformation acceptance but did not lead
to increased rates of recollection rejection. Collectively, these findings suggest an important role
for recollection rejection in rejecting misleading suggestions about events.
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Misinformation
Sometimes after a person has witnessed an event they receive false information about
some of the details of the event. For instance, if the event was a crime, police officers may ask
leading questions of the witness or the witness may discuss with a co-witness details of the crime
that are not completely accurate. A phenomenon known as the misinformation effect occurs when
these false details are incorporated into the witness’s memory of the original event (Loftus,
1974). Over the years, researchers have discovered many reasons why people come to report
misinformation (e.g., memory impairment - Loftus, Miller, & Burns 1978; misinformation
acceptance - McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; and source misattribution errors - Lindsay &
Johnson, 1987). However, little work has been done to address the issue of how people come to
reject misinformation. One way that misinformation may be rejected is through the use of a
memory editing strategy called recollection rejection. Recollection rejection occurs when the
memory for an item or event disqualifies the possibility of another item or event having
occurred. Due to the fact that participants are often misinformed about a detail that is mutually
exclusive from the detail they saw, they may be able to use recollection rejection to reject
misinformation. The purpose of the current studies is to determine the nature of the use of
recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm.
There are multiple ways in which a person may be introduced to false information after
witnessing an event. For instance, the witness may be interviewed by a police officer who
unintentionally suggests false information. Imagine that a police officer interviews two witnesses
who have witnessed a robbery. If the first witness reports that the robber was armed, when the
police officer interviews the second witness, he or she may ask “What did the armed robber look
like?” when in fact the second witness did not see a weapon. This question may lead the witness
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to incorporate the memory of a weapon into his or her memory of the robbery. Another way that
misinformation can be encountered is through co-witness discussion. One witness may correctly
remember seeing the robber with a gun, but if another witness mentions that the robber had a
knife instead, this can lead to the incorporation of these false details into the memory of the
crime.
In laboratory settings, the misinformation paradigm usually involves showing participants
a video or a set of slides, later suggesting false information about the video or slides, and then
administering a recognition test. The recognition test examines whether participant’s memory of
the original event has been affected by the false information. Researchers have used a second set
of altered slides, a narrative about the slides, a co-witness to the event, or an interview about the
event in order to introduce false information (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Loftus, 1975;
Takarangi, Parker, & Garry; 2006). Interviews and co-witness discussions about the event are the
most common ways that a person could potentially encounter false information in the real world
after witnessing a crime. On average, people report around 30% of the false information as
having occurred in the witnessed event (Loftus, 2005).
There are two types of misleading information that have been used to elicit the
misinformation effect. In some studies, contradictory misinformation, false information that
directly contradicts a piece of original event information, is used to elicit the misinformation
effect (Loftus, 1978). In other studies, additive misinformation, new misinformation which does
not contradict any of the information shown in the event, is used to induce the misinformation
effect (Loftus, 1975). Both types of misinformation have successfully elicited the misinformation
effect (Loftus, 1975; 1978). Loftus (1978) used contradictory postevent information to induce the
misinformation effect. In this study, the researchers showed people a set of slides involving a car
2

at either a stop sign or yield sign. After viewing the slides, participants filled out a questionnaire
that had a question that suggested that the car was at either a stop sign or a yield sign, whichever
piece of information that was the opposite of what they witnessed. Participants given
contradictory information (e.g., yield sign when they saw a stop sign) were more likely to choose
the contradictory information than participants given consistent information (e.g., stop sign when
they saw a stop sign).
Misleading information may also be introduced that supplants information in the original
event but does not contradict it. For instance, participants may be told that the man in the slide
show had a knife when in fact he did not have a weapon at all. Misleading information of this
type is known as additive misinformation. Loftus (1975) conducted a misinformation study that
involved giving participants additive misinformation. Participants were informed that they were
partaking in a study about a car accident. The additive piece of false information was that the car
passed a barn while driving along a road when in fact this was not in the slide show. Participants
in the control condition were asked “How fast was the white sports car going while driving along
the country road?” Participants in the misinformation condition were asked “How fast was the
white sports car going when it passed the barn while driving along the country road?” (Loftus,
1975). All participants were asked if they saw the car pass a barn a week later, the participants
who received the misinformation indicated that they had seen a barn more than participants in
the control condition.
Misinformation effects have been effectively established for both additive and
contradictory misinformation but when misinformation is contradictory, participants may be able
to employ a memory editing strategy called recollection rejection to reject the misinformation
(Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). Recollection rejection occurs when the memory
3

for an item or event excludes the possibility of another item or event having occurred. For
example, a participant using recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation may
say “I know that the man did not have a knife because I saw him with a gun.” In this example,
the presence of one weapon excludes the presence of another weapon. When additive
misinformation is presented, there is no memory for another weapon (i.e., a gun) that could be
used to reject the claim that the man had a knife. Frost (2000) examined the differences in
accepting contradictory and additive misinformation. He found greater false memory for additive
misinformation in comparison to contradictory misinformation; however, delay was also
manipulated in this study. Participant’s acceptance of misinformation was not measured until a
week after they witnessed the event and encountered postevent information. One explanation for
this finding is that participants used recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation.
Nemeth and Belli (2006) also compared the effects of contradictory and additive misinformation
but on schematic knowledge. The researchers found no differences between the acceptance of
contradictory and additive misinformation and cite the short retention interval (i.e., 10 minutes)
as an explanation for why they did not find a difference between the acceptance of contradictory
and additive misinformation effects. Participants may be so good at detecting discrepancies
between the original event and postevent information soon after the information is presented that
differences between additive and contradictory misinformation cannot be detected. In order to
test these effects, the researchers administered a remember/know paradigm to participants.
Participants reported more ‘know’ responses for additive items than for contradictory items, so it
may be that this effect was eliminated because of the type of test used to measure it.
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The Fate of the Original Memory
Soon after the initial research on the misinformation effect was published, researchers
began asking what reporting misinformation meant for the original memory. One possibility is
that the original memory remains intact even though misinformation is reported on the final test.
If the original memory is intact, why wouldn’t it be reported? Some researchers believed that
people report misinformation due to social pressures even though they remember the original
information (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Alternatively, researchers have proposed that encoding
misinformation causes the original memory to be impaired. Loftus and Greene (1980) tested this
hypothesis using a lineup study. In these studies, participants were shown either a picture of a
man, a video of a man, or a live presentation of a man. Participants then received misinformation
in the form of a picture or video of another man. In this study, a misinformation effect was found
for face memory. The point of interest is that after participants were debriefed, they were asked
to choose the face they originally saw. Ninety percent of the participants who originally selected
the “misinformed” face stuck with their decision. Similarly, a later study by Loftus et al. (1978)
warned participants that they may have been exposed to false information. After receiving the
warning, participants were asked about their memory for the misinformation and the majority of
participants still claimed that they saw the misinformation in the original event. The researchers
concluded that these findings supported the hypothesis that misinformation impairs or damages
the original memory. This idea has come to be known as the memory impairment hypothesis.
Two versions of the memory impairment hypothesis were proposed. According to the
destructive updating view, misleading information damages or completely destroys the memory
trace for the original event in storage (Loftus, 1979). One implication of the destructive updating
account is that once the memory trace is damaged, the damage cannot be undone. It is as if there
5

were data on a hard drive that has been completely wiped clean. The alternate version of the
memory impairment hypothesis was the interference account (Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983).
According to this view, misleading information impairs retrieval of details from the original
event, but those original details still remain in memory storage. One way this could occur is
through blocking. In blocking, a search of memory stops as soon as information relevant to the
answer is found. Because the misleading information was presented more recently, it is relatively
more accessible than the original event information. When the misleading information is
retrieved on the memory test, it blocks out retrieval of the original event information.
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argued that Loftus’ claim that misinformation impaired
the memory of the original event was unwarranted. They argued that misinformation provides
people who forget the original event with a choice on the final test. They stated that in the event
the original memory is not remembered, misinformation does not interfere with the memory of
the original event but instead is the only source of information available. Additionally,
McCloskey and Zaragoza argued that sometimes participants may remember both the original
event information and the false postevent information, but choose the postevent information
because they believe that the researcher, who suggested the false information, must know his or
her own study better than the participant.
To demonstrate this, consider a hypothetical study based on Loftus’s (1977) study in
which she suggested that a green car that was involved in an automobile accident was actually
blue. In the car color experiment, some control participants will remember that the car was green.
According to McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985), these participants should all choose the correct
response on the final test (i.e., the car was green). It is possible that the control participants will
not remember that the car was green. This can occur if participants did not encode the
6

information or if they forgot it between the event and test. When control participants forget
information, it cannot be attributed to the interference of postevent information because control
participants do not encounter postevent information. When asked if the color of the car was
green or blue, the control participants who do not remember would be forced to guess. Since
there are two options on the test, control participants who guess should be accurate 50% of the
time and inaccurate the other 50% of the time.
Consider a hypothetical experiment where 40% of the control participants remember the
car was green and 60% do not, the overall percent correct will be 70% (40% who remember plus
half of the participants who are guessing 30%). The misinformation effect is detected by
comparing the difference in the percentages of original information recognized on the
recognition test between the mislead condition and control condition. Given the example
provided above about the control participants, less than 40% of the misled participants should
remember that the car was green if the postevent information actually impaired the memory for
the original information. Performance on the recognition test would be worse in the misled
condition than the control condition if fewer misled participants remember the original
information. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argue that even if both groups remember the
original information at the same rate, the mislead condition would still perform worse than the
control condition.
If postevent information does not affect mislead participants’ original memory, 40% of
participants will remember that the car is green and 60% will not. These would be the same rates
as the control condition. Just like control participants, assume that the mislead participants who
remember that the car was green will choose the correct response on the test. What about the
mislead participants who do not remember that the car was green? They are no longer limited to
7

guessing. Participants who do not remember the original event information (green car) but do
remember the postevent information (blue car) will presumably choose ‘blue car’ on the test and
therefore be incorrect. Participants who do not remember the original or postevent information
will be limited to guessing on the recognition test. If any of the participants forget the original
information (green car) but remember the postevent information (blue car), the accuracy rate of
misled participants will be lower compared to control participants. By introducing an additional
source of information, accuracy rates will be lower in the misled condition. This reduction in
accuracy does not have to be attributed to the memory impairment hypothesis.
In order to test for these possibilities, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) developed a
“modified” final test. In the traditional final test, participants must choose from the piece of
misinformation (e.g., hammer) and the correct information (e.g., screwdriver), and the
misinformation effect is said to have occurred when the misinformed condition accepts more
misinformation than the control condition. On the “modified” final test, participants were asked
to choose between the original event information (e.g., screwdriver) and a new piece of
information (e.g., wrench). The idea was that if memory was impaired by the misinformation,
then people should do more poorly even on a test where the misinformation was not an option.
If misinformation destructively updates memory for the original item in storage, then it is
hypothesized that the original event detail is no longer available for retrieval. Therefore, on a
modified recognition test, participants should do more poorly because the memory is no longer
accessible. With the exception of the modified final test, participants in these studies were tested
in the same way that Loftus tested participants. The results showed that the misled condition did
not differ from the control condition on reporting the novel items. Based on these findings, the
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researchers claimed that the memory of the original event was not impaired by misleading
postevent information.
Ceci, Ross, and Toglia (1987; Experiments 3 and 4) tested whether misinformation could
affect children’s memory using a) the traditional misinformation paradigm and b) the modified
final test (Loftus, 1975; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). As expected, the misinformation effect
was found using the traditional misinformation paradigm; however, somewhat surprisingly, the
misinformation effect was also found using the modified final test. Belli (1989) also conducted a
misinformation experiment, this time using a yes/no recognition test instead of a forced choice
recognition test, which controlled for McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985)’s concern about response
bias. On the yes/no recognition test, participants were presented with items and instructed to say
“yes” when the items were presented in the original event and “no” if they were not. There were
three types of items on this test: a) targets, items that were presented at study, b) postevent
information, false information presented after the original event, and c) novel information that
was not mentioned during or after the event. Belli (1989) found that when misinformation was
introduced, the recognition of items from the original event decreased. This finding provided
evidence that postevent information interferes with or impairs the memory for the original event.
Tversky and Tuchin (1989) conducted a similar study using a yes/no recognition test. The
researchers’ found that participants performed worse on items for which they were misled about
in comparison to items they were not. The researchers took these findings as evidence that
misleading information affects the memory of the original information. However, participants in
this study sometimes accepted both the original information and postevent information, which
suggests that the memory for the original information is not always impaired. Additionally, Belli,
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Windschitl, McCarthy, and Winfrey (1992) found memory impairments on the modified test
after a long retention interval (5-7 days) but not a short retention interval (15 minutes).
Lindsay and Johnson (1987) proposed that misinformation may be accepted because
people incorrectly attribute misinformation as having occurred in the original event. They called
this misattribution a source monitoring error. A source monitoring error is committed when
participants remember the original event information and the postevent information but confuse
the sources, leading them to report that the postevent information occurred in the original event
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsey, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981).
Zaragoza and Lane (1994) sought to determine whether people actually confuse
postevent information with their memories of the original event. To test this, participants were
asked to make overt source judgments on the final test. Additive postevent information was used
in order to reduce the chances of participants detecting discrepancies between the original and
the postevent information. Participants were instructed to indicate whether they “saw”, “read” or
“both” saw and read about an item. Some participants indicated that they “saw” the postevent
information in the original event. This finding provides evidence that participants believed that
postevent information was shown in the original event.
Loftus and Hoffman (1989) stated that misinformation acceptance and memory
impairment are both involved in accepting misinformation. They discussed how misinformation
acceptance, memory impairment, and source misattribution can all lead participants to report
misinformation. The researchers continued to uphold the claim that memory impairment can and
does occur while embracing the idea that misinformation acceptance plays a role in the
misinformation effect. In accordance with their conclusion, evidence has been found for each of
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the following theories: misinformation acceptance, memory impairment, and source
misattribution. It is possible that within a study or paradigm that all three of these types of
misinformation acceptances could occur. For instance, a participant could have seen a man drink
a Coke in a video but received postevent information that the man drank Pepsi. On the final test,
he or she could be confused as to whether they saw Pepsi or Coke in the video. Another
participant may recall the source of both the Coke and Pepsi but think that the experimenter who
provided the postevent information is more likely to know what happened. This may lead the
participant to report that the man drank a Pepsi in the video. Finally, another participant’s
memory for the video may have been impaired by encountering the postevent information about
the man drinking a Pepsi.
Summary: What leads to the acceptance of misinformation?
During the memory impairment debate, researchers found several causes of the
misinformation effect. These causes fall into three broad categories: memory impairment,
misinformation acceptance, and response bias. One cause of choosing misinformation on a final
test occurs when a person is exposed to postevent information and it leads to the impairment of
memory for the original event (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). This phenomenon has been
called memory impairment. Lindsay and Johnson (1987, 1989) discovered another cause for
accepting misinformation which is known as source monitoring errors. Source monitoring errors
are a form of memory impairment that occur when a person remembers both the original event
and misinformation, but remembers the misinformation as having occurred during the original
event. Misinformation acceptance occurs when participants who remember both sources of
information choose the postevent information. Another form of misinformation acceptance
occurs when the participant chooses the postevent information because he or she does not
11

remember the original information but does remember the postevent information. Lastly, in
some cases the participant may forget both the original event and the misinformation in which
case they resort to guessing.
What leads to the rejection of false information?
There are three main reasons why participants would reject misinformation. One reason a
participant may reject misinformation is because he or she remembers the original event
information, the postevent information, and their respective sources. Rejecting misinformation in
this fashion is akin to recollection rejection. Next, a person may be led to reject misinformation
because he or she remembers the original information and forgets the postevent information.
Finally, the person may forget both the original information and the postevent information and
make a guess.
Strategies Used to Discern True From False Information
There are a number of strategies that can be used to accept or reject information.
Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus (1986; Loftus, 1992) suggest discrepancy detection is one
mechanism used to accept or reject misinformation. Discrepancy detection occurs when a
participant detects a discrepancy between the original event and the postevent information at the
time the postevent information is encountered. When a person encounters information about a
witnessed event, they use discrepancy detection to identify differences between what they
remember witnessing and the information being provided to them. The quality of a person’s
memory affects their ability to use discrepancy detection (Tousignant et al., 1986). If a person
cannot remember an event well, they will struggle to detect differences between what they
witnessed and the postevent information they received, because there is less information to
12

compare the new information to. The discrepancy detection principle states that “recollections
are more likely to change if a person does not immediately detect discrepancies between
postevent information and memory for the original event” (Loftus, 1992; p121). As a result,
discrepancies between the two sources are less likely to be detected when original event
information and postevent information are spread apart further in time. Tousignant et al. (1986)
sought to provide direct evidence for the use of discrepancy detection in the misinformation
paradigm. They believed that discrepancy detection could explain people’s responses to
warnings, delays in misinformation, and the strength of misinformation. To test for evidence of
discrepancy detection in Experiment 1, the researchers measured how quickly participants read
postevent information. The researchers hypothesized that if a discrepancy was detected,
participants would read or think over the postevent information, taking more time to come to a
resolution of what they witnessed. In Experiment 2, discrepancy detection was directly measured
by asking participants to report when they detected a discrepancy in addition to measuring
reading speed (Tousignant et al., 1986). Slower reading times were found to be associated with
reduced acceptance of false information. It follows that quicker reading times were associated
with higher acceptance rates of false information. In another experiment, reading speed was
experimentally manipulated by instructing participants to read the postevent information quickly
or slowly. This was done in order to confirm that slower reading times, not people prone to slow
reading, were associated with a decrease in the acceptance of misinformation (Tousignant et al.,
1986). These studies confirmed that slower reading times were associated with higher levels of
discrepancy detection and accuracy. Other research found that participants whose attention is
divided during the encoding of postevent information are more likely to report misinformation
than participants whose attention was not divided (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998; Lane, 2006). These
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studies provided evidence that the resources necessary to detect discrepancies between two
sources of information are not available to participants who are distracted.
Another strategy that may be used to accept or reject misinformation is recollection
rejection. Recollection rejection is a memory editing strategy that reduces rates of false
recognition (Brainerd et al., 2003) through comparing possible events when only one could have
actually occurred. When one of these events is recognized, the others can be rejected. For
example, if a person can remember parking their car in the parking lot at work they can reject the
idea that they took a bus or a place to work because it is only possible to take one of mode of
transportation.
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists have been used to examine recollection rejection
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm consists of lists of words that
all relate to one critical unpresented word, which is known as a critical lure. For example, one list
consists of words related to royalty. Royalty is the critical lure so it is not presented at study but a
number of people recall it at test because it is so similar to the other words they have studied.
When recollection rejection occurs in the context of the DRM paradigm, people compare their
memory for one word (i.e., king) to other related words (i.e., princess, royalty, etc.).
There are a number of findings to support the idea that people are more likely to falsely
accept a related item that was not presented at study than an unrelated item that was not
presented at study (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). When people’s memory of the DRM lists is
tested, they accept the critical lure as part of the studied word list at very high rates (Lampinen,
Meier, Anal, & Leding, 2005; Lampinen, Odegard, Blackshear, & Toglia, 2005). In addition to
strong evidence for these findings, researchers have found that under certain circumstances
people are more likely to falsely accept an unrelated word than a related word (Brainerd, Reyna,
14

& Kneer, 1995). These findings have been explained by the use of recollection rejection, which
allows people to compare related items or events in memory to determine what happened. If
someone can remember that the word horse (target) was presented, they can be more confident
that the word pony (related lure) was not presented, whereas they would be less confident that
pony was not presented if they did not remember the word horse. If someone is asked if the word
cup (unrelated lure) was presented but they have no recollection of another related word (i.e.,
glass), they may say “it’s possible that the word cup was presented, because I do not recall a
related word being presented.” Recollection rejection has been thoroughly investigated using
words, pictures, and statements; however, no research has examined whether people can use
recollection rejection to reject false postevent information like that used in the misinformation
paradigm (Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Scharcter, 2006; Reyna & Kiernan, 1995). There are a number
of ways studies have measured recollection rejection. I thought that using receiver operating
characteristics to measure recollection rejection was a fitting choice for the misinformation
paradigm.
Directly Measuring Recollection Rejection
ROC Curves
Receiver operator characteristic curves are scatterplots of the proportion of correct
recognitions and the proportion of false recognitions at varying confidence levels (Yonelinas,
1997). These values are obtained through old/new recognition tests. An “old” judgment indicates
the belief that an item was studied; a “new” judgment indicates the belief that an item was not
studied. On the x-axis, the probability of accepting an item that was not studied (unrelated items
on one plot and related items on another plot) at various confidence levels are plotted. On the y-
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axis, the probability of accepting targets at various confidence levels is plotted. The furthest
point on the left of the graph shows the rate at which the most confidently remembered items, old
(on the y axis) and new (on the x axis) are accepted as “sure-old”. The next point, “maybe-old”
includes the rate at which old and new items are accepted as “sure-old” and “maybe-old”. This
continues until the final point, “sure-new” which incorporates the rate at which old and new
items are accepted as “sure-new” and all of the other possible judgments. The point on the yintercept that the curve intersects represents “sure-old” the amount of recollection occurring
because at this point, signal detection process is maximally conservative (Lampinen et al., 2005).
When the upper x-intercept of the “old-similar” (related lure) data is higher than the upper xintercept of the “old-new” (unrelated lure) data, recollection rejection has occurred. The
difference between these two numbers provides a measure of how much recollection rejection is
occurring. The symmetry of ROC curves contributes to their ability to provide a measure of
recollection rejection. When only familiarity processes account for recognition decisions and the
distribution of recognition is normal and of equal variance, symmetrical ROCs will occur
(Brainerd et al. 2003). Yonelinas (1994) found that these plots are skewed when measuring
recognition; this occurs when distributions of familiarity values are not normal or have unequal
variances.
Rotello, Macmillian, and Van Tassel (2000) demonstrated that (ROC) curves are useful
in determining the use of recollection rejection in recognition tasks, assuming a dual-process
model of recognition. The researchers propose a model of recognition involving both familiarity
and recollection. In such cases, the y-intercept of the ROC curve will be greater than zero and the
slope will be decreasing. The decreasing slope is due to the distribution of familiarity. When
“old-similar” ROCs are plotted, instead of “old-new”, they have a slight curve (Rotello et al.
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2000). Rotello et al. (2000) argued that recollection rejection occurs when distractors are placed
in the “sure-new” category and no old items are placed into the “sure-new” category. This causes
the ROC curve to hit the upper x-axis when the false alarm rate is less than 1. The researchers
argue that this occurrence represents recollection rejection (Figure 1).

Figure One: Hypothetical ROC curve that
indicates the presence of both familiarity and
recall-to-reject processing1
1
Rotello et al. (2000)

In a series of experiments, Lampinen, Odegard, Blackshear, and Toglia (2005) tested
whether ROC curves would show evidence for recollection rejection by presenting participants
with a list of words. Participants were tested over their memory for words that were presented,
related words that were not presented, and unrelated words that were not presented. When target
recognition was regressed onto false recognition for related words, they found the upper xintercept to be about .71 which indicates that about 29% of the related words were rejected by
recollection rejection.
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Phantom ROC
A phantom ROC model was devised to examine phantom recollection and recollection
rejection using ROC curves (Lampinen et al., 2005). Phantom recollection is a phenomenon that
occurs when a person experiences a false recognition as compellingly as he or she experiences
true memories. When phantom recollection occurs, it can lead to erroneous recollection
rejection, which is the rejection of a target item. The phantom ROC model retains some of the
assumptions of Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, and Mojardin (2001) phantom recollection model and
Yonelinas (1999) dual process model. Lampinen et al. (2005) assumed that familiarity is not an
all-or-none, but a graded process like Yonelinas. Yonelinas used ROC curves to model
recollection and familiarity (1994; 1997). The phantom ROC model builds off of this by using
ROC curves to estimate additional memory processes influenced by recollection and familiarity
(e.g., recollection rejection and phantom recollection).
The phantom ROC model uses ROC plots of target recognition against related lures and
unrelated lures like Rotello et al. (2000), to examine recollection rejection. The phantom ROC
model adds the measurement of phantom recollection and phantom recollection rejection to form
a complete model. Brainerd et al. (2001) also accounted for phantom recollection and phantom
recollection rejection but instead used a conjoint recognition model.
The phantom ROC model measures two high confidence, all-or-none processes:
recollection rejection and phantom recollection. Finally, familiarity for targets and familiarity for
related items, which are graded processes, are measured.
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Table 1. Parameters estimated by the phantom ROC model.
Parameter Description
Rt:

Recollection of targets

ER t:

Phantom recollection rejection for targets

d’ t:

Memory strength for targets based on familiarity

P r:

Phantom recollection for related lures

Rr :

Recollection rejection for related lures

d’ r :

Memory strength for related lures based on familiarity

Related Lures in the Phantom ROC model.
There are a number of reasons a participant may accept or reject a related lure. If the
participant uses recollection rejection, he or she will reject a related lure because they remember
an item that disqualifies the related lure from having occurred. If phantom recollection occurs,
the participant will accept the related lure on the basis that they believe that the target did not
occur. Finally, a participant may accept a related lure because the item is familiar to the
participant. The probability of these different memory processes is estimated by the phantom
recollection model by fitting a multinomial model. Phantom recollection and recollection
rejection are estimated by fitting an ROC curve that plots cumulative recognition of related lures
against cumulative recognition of unrelated lures. Familiarity for related lures is expressed in
terms of the sensitivity (i.e., d’ r) of the underlying signal detection model.
The equations for the related lure ROC curve are as follows, where cj refers to the
shifting response criterion:
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P(related) = (1- R r ) P r + (1- R r ) (1- P r) Ø(d’ r - Cj )
P(unrelated) = Ø(- Cj )
Figure 2 is a hypothetical ROC curve using the phantom ROC model (Lampinen et al.,
2005). The equations for related and unrelated lures indicate that the signal detection process
only comes into play if both recollection rejection and phantom recollection rejection fail to
occur. When the signal detection process is maximally conservative, the equations are the
following:
P(related) = (1- R r) P r
P(unrelated) = 0
When the signal detection process is maximally conservative, the y-intercept in the model
is (1-Rr)P r. One assumption of the phantom ROC model is that recollection rejection overpowers
phantom recollection. Therefore, the y-intercept represents the probability of phantom
recollection occurring.
If the response criterion is more liberal, the ROC curve should cross the diagonal
representing chance performance and therefore should intercept below (1,1) on the curve. When
signal detection is maximally liberal, the equations simplify to:
P(unrelated)=1
P(related)= Ø(d’ r - Cj )
If any recollection rejection occurs, the ROC curves should cross the diagonal and
intercept somewhere below (1,1). Recollection rejection can be estimated by determining how
far below (1,1) the ROC curve is.
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Figure Two: Hypothetical ROC Curve Illustrating
Target Recognition Under Phantom ROC2
2
Lampinen et al. (2005)
Target recognition in the Phantom ROC model.
Recollections occur when a participant accepts targets because they match the
participants' exact memory trace. Targets can also be accepted because they are familiar.
Participants can mistakenly reject a target because they “remember” the related lure as having
occurred, as in the case of phantom recollection.
Recollection, phantom recollection, and familiarity are all estimated from the ROC curve.
Familiarity for targets is expressed in terms of the sensitivity (i.e., d’ t) of the underlying signal
detection model.
The equations for the ROC curve for target recognition are:
P(target) = Rt + (1 - Rt)(1 - ER t) Ø(d’ t - Cj )
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P(unrelated) = Ø(- Cj )
Recollection estimates are provided by the y-intercept of the ROC curve.
P(target) = Rt
P(unrelated) = 1
Thus, phantom recollection will only occur if a recollection does not occur according to
the phantom recollection model.
In Experiment 1, Lampinen et al. (2005) tested Brainerd’s et al. (2001) prediction that
phantom recollection would be more likely to occur when the related lure is a good match for the
underlying gist memory trace of the target. Phantom recollection for critical lures and missing
exemplars were compared because when an item is closely related to the gist traces for the target,
such as critical lures, phantom recollection should be higher in comparison to when an item is
less closely related to the gist trace for the target, such as missing exemplars. In the DRM
paradigm, critical lures are words that all of the presented words are related to. The critical lure
is a word that is not presented at study but represents the gist of the word list. Missing exemplars
are words that are not presented on the study lists; however, these words were generated to be
related to critical lures but are not related to the whole list of words. Therefore, missing
exemplars are less closely related to the list than the critical lures.
In this experiment, participants studied multiple DRM lists. After the study phase, they
took an old/new recognition test and ranked the confidence of their responses on a 4 point scale
ranging from “not at all confident” to “extremely confident”. To make these yes/no judgments,
participants were either instructed use to target instructions, related instructions, or target and
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related instructions (Brainerd et al., 2001). Additionally, half of participants were asked to make
remember/know responses for each item. Remember judgments map onto recollection while
know judgments map onto familiarity. For “new” judgments, participants were asked to indicate
“remember” if they could remember information that made them believe that the item was not
presented during the study phase.
As predicted, phantom recollection of critical lures was higher than the phantom
recollection of missing exemplars. This occurred because critical lures provided a stronger cue
for target items than missing exemplars. ROC analyses found that remember-based responses
were more common for targets than critical lures. The remember/know judgments which were
considered as support for self-reported recollection rejection did not match up with ROC
estimates of recollection rejection. The researchers hypothesize that this occurred because the
instructions for the task may not have been clear enough.
In Experiment 2, study list length was varied in order to manipulate gist strength. It has
been hypothesized that longer lists are more likely to induce gist representations (Brainerd et al.,
2001). The method in this experiment was the same as that in Experiment 1.
The phantom recollection rejection of targets did not differ from recollection rejection of
critical lures. Performance differences for target recognition, phantom recollection rejection, and
recollection rejection were not found between list lengths. It was predicted that long lists would
cause greater similarity for targets and critical lures, but this result was not found.
Regarding false memories, the researchers found that ROC curves that plot related lures
against unrelated lures intercepted the Y-axis above 0. This occurrence provides evidence for
recollection and phantom recollection. These studies supported the prediction that when gist
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trace is strong, phantom recollection will occur. In Experiment 1, this was evidenced by the
greater y-intercept for critical lures than missing exemplars. In Experiment 2, this was evidenced
by the greater y-intercept for long list lures compared to short list lures.
The use of the phantom ROC model to measure recollection rejection and other memory
editing processes has several benefits. The phantom ROC model is able to measure the
parameters of the model with the use of only one instructional condition. Brainerd et al.’s (2001)
conjoint recognition model of phantom recollection requires three different instructional
conditions and therefore more participants to obtain the same estimates. Additionally, the
phantom ROC model clearly predicts that if any recollection rejection is occurring, the ROC
curves should cross the diagonal and intercept somewhere below (1,1) (Lampinen et al. 2005).
Additionally, the rate of recollection rejection is provided by the amount below (1,1) that the
ROC curve falls.
Lampinen, Watkins, and Odegard (2006) examined dual process predictions about
recollection rejection using the phantom ROC model (three process model). Participants studied
and were tested over their memory for pictures. On the test, there were targets, related lures, and
unrelated lures. Targets were pictures that were presented during study, related lures were
pictures of the target items taken at a different angle, and unrelated lures were pictures that are
unrelated to targets and were not presented during study. The test included instructions that were
similar to the conjoint recognition model’s test instructions. The first set of instructions was
designed to elicit gist memory and the second set of instructions was designed to elicit verbatim
memory. In the first set of instructions, the “meaning question” instructed participants to say
‘yes’ if they saw the item in the study phase even if at study it was at a different angle (i.e., a
photo of a dog head on versus a photo of a dog in profile view). In the second set of instructions,
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participants were asked to respond ‘yes’ only if they saw the exact photo on the “standard
recognition question”. Confidence ratings for the responses to both question types were obtained.
In addition, attention was manipulated in order to determine its effect on recollection rejection
rates. Half of participants were assigned to the divided attention condition. These participants
were asked to count backwards by 3s during the study phase. The other half of participants
completed the study phase without any distractions.
The researchers had three specific predictions. One prediction was that related lure ROC
curves would be deflected below the diagonal when substantial recollection rejection occurred.
This should occur because recollection rejection can provide a more certain basis for rejecting an
item than a lack of familiarity. Target recognition, familiarity, and erroneous recollection
rejection were estimated by ROC curves in which targets and unrelated lure probabilities were
plotted. When meaning instructions were given, it was predicted that related items would be
accepted; however, when standard instructions were given, it was predicted that they would be
rejected. This prediction is based on the findings that recollection leads to the acceptance of
related items under gist instructions but not under verbatim instructions. Finally, it was
hypothesized that high confidence flip flops would occur if participants were asked both standard
and meaning questions for the same item. High confidence flip flops occur when the high
confidence rejection of related lures under one set of instructions (standard) becomes high
confidence acceptances of those same items under the opposite set of instructions (meaning).
ROC curves for related lures were deflected below the diagonal as predicted, indicating
that substantial recollection rejection occurred. There was less of a downward deflection on the
target ROC curve, which provides evidence that recollection rejection of related lures was more
common than erroneous recollection rejection of targets. The y-intercept of the target ROC curve
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was much lower for participants who were distracted than for participants who were not.
Participants who were distracted at study therefore made fewer recollection-based acceptances
than participants who were not distracted. High confidence flip flops occurred more often for
related lures than targets or unrelated lures. The data on high confidence flips flops indicate that
there was a lot of recollection rejection of related lures. The data also show the erroneous
recollection rejection of targets by participants.
In Experiment 2, half of participants were informed that the photos were mutually
exclusive, while the other half of participants were told that it was possible to have seen pictures
from two different camera angles (i.e., the items were not exclusive). Instructions about
exclusivity were manipulated because using recollection rejection should be easier when a
participant is alerted to the exclusive nature of items.
For the standard instruction ROC curve, there was a downward deflection of both the
mutually exclusive curve and the non-exclusive curve. This indicates that all participants used
recollection rejection to accept targets and reject related lures. Erroneous recollection rejection of
targets did not occur as often as recollection rejection, evidenced by the fact that the target
standard instruction ROC curve did not have much of a downward deflection. Similar to the
results found in experiment one, high confidence flip flops were more common for related lures
than for targets, which were more common than unrelated lures. Mutual exclusivity instructions
did not seem to have an effect on participants’ judgments. Lampinen et al. (2006) proposed that
the instructions may not have affected participants’ choices because participants are already very
capable of using recollection rejection without instructions. Alternatively, other researchers have
proposed that recollection rejection may be unconscious and therefore unaffected by
metacognitive control (Brainerd et al., 2003). This research supported the hypothesis that ROC
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curves would be reflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection occurs. As predicted,
recollection caused people to be confident that some proportion of the related lures were not
presented during the study. This is what causes the ROC curve to be reflected below the
diagonal. The ROC curve was lower on the right side when using standard instructions and
higher when using the meaning instructions. This is due to the fact that acceptance of related
lures occurred under meaning instructions but was rejected under standard instructions. Both
experiments provided evidence for the prediction that high confidence flip flops would occur for
related lures. Phantom ROC, a three process model, closely follows the findings and predictions
of the two process models discussed above. The new component that this model added to the
dual process models (conjoint recognition and ROC) is the measurement of phantom recollection
using ROC curves.
In the current studies, I examined the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation
paradigm. The goal of these studies was to determine if and how recollection rejection is used a)
when someone has witnessed a crime and b) when he or she received false information (related
and unrelated to the event) about the crime. This research has important implications for
determining how often recollection rejection is used in real life scenarios.
Pilot Study
Hypothesis One: The acceptance of additive misinformation should be higher than the
acceptance of contradictory misinformation because people can use recollection rejection to
reject contradictory misinformation but not additive misinformation.
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Hypothesis Two: People will report using recollection rejection less than the other
measures (e.g., pROC curves, contradictory vs. additive misinformation) because recollection
rejection is not always a conscious process.
Methods
Participants
One hundred and thirty-six general psychology students from the University of Arkansas
participated for course credit. Participants who indicated they knew the true nature of the study
were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally knew the person in the slide show
were excluded from analyses. Fourteen participants indicated knowledge about the study or
recognized the subject of the slide show. Therefore, one hundred and twenty-two participants’
data were analyzed. The sample was predominately Caucasian (90.2%, 4.92% African American,
1.64% Hispanic, 1.64% Asian, 1.64% Bi-racial), and 63% female, and the average age was 19.22
years (SD=1.61, Range=18-27).
Design
The study manipulated item type (e.g., foil, additive, contradictory) in order to establish
misinformation effects for both contradictory and additive item types.
Materials
Participants viewed a slide show of a handy man snooping around a client’s house while
the client is away, similar to materials created by Takarangi, Parker, and Garry (2006). Three
different versions of the slide show were constructed. There were a total of nine critical items
which were split up into additive, contradictory, and unrelated items. The critical items all served
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as each item type in one of the slide shows. A narrative about each slide show was constructed.
The narrative detailed all of the events that occurred in the slide show. Additive items were items
that were not shown in the slide shows but were mentioned in the text. Therefore, additive items
were misinformation items that were presented only in the narrative. Contradictory items were
items in the narrative that contradicted the footage in the slide show. For example, the man was
shown drinking a Pepsi in the slide show but in the narrative it is suggested that he drank a CocaCola. Unrelated items were items that were not shown in the slide show or mentioned in the
narrative, but were asked about on a final test. There were also true and false filler items on the
final test. The final test was an old/new recognition judgment test. On the first page of the test,
there were explicit instructions asking participants to respond according to what they saw in the
slide show. When an item was viewed in the slide show, participants were instructed to indicate
“yes”. When an item was not viewed in the slide show, participants were instructed to indicate
“no”. The test consisted of 24 items: 15 fillers, 3 unrelated, 3 contradictory, and 3 additive items.
In addition to indicating whether they saw the item in the slide show, participants were asked to
rank their confidence in their responses. Confidence rankings were “extremely confident”,
“moderately confident”, “somewhat confident”, and “not at all confident”. Self-report judgments
were collected from participants by asking them to “explain your response” to each question.
Lampinen, Odegard, and Neuschatz (2004) used this self-report method as an estimate of
recollection rejection as well as other acceptance and rejection strategies.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory
for normal everyday events. Participants consented to participate before the study began. First,
participants viewed a slide show and then they took part in a 4 minute filler task. After the filler
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task, participants read a narrative about the slide show that was “written by a police officer”.
After this, participants took part in a 2 minute filler task. Participants then completed an old/new
recognition test. Prior to recognition test administration, the experimenter instructed the
participant on how to complete the test.
Results
Data Analysis
For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items,
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded and analyzed using a one way repeated
measures ANOVA. The confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit to the phantom
ROC model using procedures outlined in Lampinen et al. (2005). The model parameters were
compared to the self-reported rates of recollection rejection. The self-report data was coded by
two RAs in order to obtain an inter-rater reliability score. We chose Pearson’s r as a measure of
correlation between our two coders. Each self-report response was coded for recollection
rejection, distinctiveness, discrepancy detection, video recall, narrative recall, guessing,
familiarity, and memory. I was primarily interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of
these studies, so those are the only self-report analyses reported in this manuscript.
The purpose of this study was to learn about the use of recollection rejection in the
misinformation paradigm. The results are divided into three sections: misinformation results,
phantom ROC, and the self-report of recollection rejection. Unless otherwise specified, all
results were considered significant at p<.05 (two-tailed).
Misinformation Results. Accuracy rates for the critical items are presented in Figure
Three. A one way ANOVA revealed that the three types of critical items (unrelated, additive, and
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contradictory) differed significantly, F (2, 270) =3.05, p=.05, ɳ2p = .022. Pairwise comparisons
revealed that unrelated item accuracy (M=.86, SD=.24) was significantly higher than additive
item accuracy (M=.67, SD=.35) and contradictory item accuracy (M=.73, SD=.32), p’s <.001.
I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than
contradictory misinformation acceptance. Contradictory misinformation is exclusive from a
corresponding piece of original information (i.e., Coke vs. Pepsi) but additive misinformation is
not exclusive. Therefore, people should be able to use recollection rejection to reject
contradictory misinformation but not additive misinformation. Consistent with this hypothesis,
pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy on contradictory items (M=.73, SD=.32) was higher
than accuracy on additive items (M=.67, SD=.35), p=.035.

Phantom ROC. The data was analyzed by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas (1997) and Lampinen et al. (2005), we used the Solver
add-in to Excel to obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated
with the model. The best fitting ROC curves are shown in Figure 4 and parameter estimates for
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the model are shown in Table 2. Overall, the model provided an excellent fit, accounting for
99.997% of the variance.
For additive items, estimates of recollection rejection were approximately 6% and
estimates of phantom recollection were at 14%. For contradictory items, estimates of recollection
rejection were at 42% and estimates of phantom recollection were at 26%.

Table Two.
Parameters
c1
c2
c3
c4
6.41 1.47 1.17 1.03

c5
0.75

Additive Items
c6
c7
0.13 -0.54

RR
0.06

PhR
d'
0.14 0.28

Contradictory Items
RR
0.42

PhR
0.25

d'
0.48

Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=.68, SD=.7)
and RA2 (M=.42, SD=.65) was r(136) = .74, p < .001. On unrelated items, the agreement was
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r(136)=.55, p<.001. On contradictory items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.64, SD=.92) and
RA2 (M=1.58, SD=.93) was r(136)=.86, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1
(M=.47, SD=.6) and RA2 (M=.35, SD=.55) was r(136)=.64, p<.001.
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 55%. The selfreported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 15%. The self-reported rate of
recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.
A one way ANOVA was conducted to determine the differences in self-reported
recollection rejection by item type. The main effect of item type was significant, F (2, 242)
=108.48, p<.001, ɳ2p = .473. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants self-reported
recollection rejection more on contradictory items (M= .55, SE=.03) than additive (M=.15, SE=
.02) or unrelated items (M=.18, SE=.02), p’s<.001.
Discussion
In this study, I examined the use of recollection rejection in an ecologically valid way
using the misinformation paradigm. The goals of this study were to a) establish whether our
materials would replicate the effects of previous misinformation research and b) determine if or
to what extent people use recollection rejection to reject event-based suggestions. I found support
for the use of recollection rejection through the three methods used to measure it in the
misinformation paradigm.
A misinformation effect was found for both the contradictory and additive
misinformation. Consistent with my hypothesis, I found that additive misinformation was
accepted more than contradictory misinformation. Evidence for this hypothesis also came from
the ROC curves for additive and contradictory misinformation items. The ROC analysis for the
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contradictory items indicated the recollection rejection occurred 42% of the time. In comparison,
recollection rejection for additive items occurred 6% of the time.
I expected that the self-reported rates of recollection rejection may be lower than the
other measures of recollection rejection indicated. This was not the case. The self-reported rate
of recollection rejection was 54% for the contradictory items. In comparison, the estimate of
recollection rejection of the contradictory items by the phantom ROC model was 43%. Although
these differences are likely not significantly different, the rate of self-reported recollection
rejection was definitely not lower than the other estimates. Perhaps using recollection rejection to
reject items encountered in the environment (i.e., narrative) is more overt and conscious than
rejecting items such as words.
Experiment One: Delay Study
Hypothesis 1: Participants who receive shorter delays will accept less postevent
information than participants with longer delays.
Hypothesis 2: Participants who receive shorter delays will be more likely to use
recollection rejection than participants who receive longer delays.
Due to the fact that there are mixed findings on delay times in misinformation studies, it
is important to test the effects of manipulating delay times on the acceptance of the two types of
misinformation and the use of recollection rejection. Using recollection rejection should be
easier with short retention intervals because participants have to remember the original event
information and postevent information for less time. Additionally, I am interested in the effects
of manipulating delay time on the acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation.
Researchers using short delays have found no difference in the acceptance of additive versus
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contradictory misinformation (Nemeth & Belli, 2006), whereas research using long delays has
found that contradictory misinformation is accepted less often than additive misinformation
(Frost, 2000). This may be because additive misinformation is especially distinctive immediately
after viewing the original event. However, it should also be easier to use recollection rejection
immediately after viewing the original event.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and thirty-nine general psychology students from the University of
Arkansas participated for course credit. Participants who indicated that they knew that the study
was about the misinformation effect were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally
knew the subject of the slide show were excluded from analyses. Thirteen participants indicated
knowledge about the study or recognized the subject of the slide show. Two hundred and twentysix participants were included for analyses. The sample was predominately Caucasian (84.1%,
6.19% African American, 2.65% Hispanic, 3.54% Asian, 2.21% Native American, .04% Biracial, 1.32% unreported), 62.4% female, and the average age was 19.17 years (SD=1.29,
Range=18-29).
Design
The study was a 3 (item type: foil, additive, contradictory) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x
2 (second delay: short, long) mixed factorial design with delay lengths as between subjects
factors. The materials used for this study were the same as the materials for the pilot study.
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Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory
for normal everyday events. Participants consented to participate before the study began. First,
participants viewed a slide show then they took part in a 2 (short) or 14 (long) minute filler task.
After the filler task, participants read a narrative about the slide show that was “written by a
police officer”. After this, participants took part in another 2 (short) or 14 (long) minute filler
task. Participants then completed an old/new recognition test. Prior to recognition test
administration, the experimenter instructed the participant on how to complete the test.
Results
Data Analysis
For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items,
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded and analyzed using a 3 (critical items:
unrelated items, contradictory items, and additive items) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x 2 (second
delay: short, long) ANOVA to determine the effects of item type and differing delay lengths. The
confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit to the phantom ROC model. The model
was compared to the self-report data. According to dual process theory, the ROC curves will be
deflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection is occurring. Since recollection
rejection can be used for contradictory misinformation, I expected the ROC curve to be deflected
below the diagonal for the contradictory items. Since recollection rejection cannot be used for
additive misinformation I did not expect the ROC curve to be deflected below the diagonal for
the additive items. The self-report data was coded by two RAs to obtain an inter-rater reliability
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score. I was primarily interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of these studies so
those are the only self-report analyses reported in this manuscript.
The purpose of this study was to learn about the effect of delays on use of recollection
rejection in the misinformation paradigm. The results are divided into three sections:
misinformation results, phantom ROC, and the self-report of recollection rejection. Unless
otherwise specified, all results were considered significant at p<.05 (two-tailed).
Misinformation Results. Data from the misinformation results are presented in Figure 5.
In order to analyze misinformation effects and the effects of delays a 3 (item: unrelated,
contradictory, additive) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x 2 (second delay: short, long) ANOVA was
conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item type, F (2, 442) = 42.26, p<.001, ɳ2p =
.16. Pairwise comparisons revealed that unrelated item accuracy (M=.84, SD=.24) was
significantly higher than additive item accuracy (M=.61, SD=.35) and contradictory item
accuracy (M=.75, SD=.29), p’s<.001.
I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than
contradictory misinformation acceptance because contradictory items are more conducive to the
use of recollection rejection. Pairwise comparisons revealed that contradictory item accuracy
(M=.75, SD=.29) was significantly higher than additive item accuracy (M=.61, SD=.35), p<.001,
providing evidence for my hypothesis.
The ANOVA revealed no effect of delay one on accuracy, F(1, 221)= .63, p=.43, ɳ2p =
.003, no effect of delay two on accuracy, F(1, 221)= .35, p=.56, ɳ2p = .002, no interaction
between delay one and delay two, F(1, 221)= .58, p=.45, ɳ2p = .003, no interaction between
delay one and item type, F(2, 442)=1.47, p=.23, ɳ2p = .007, no interaction between delay two and
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item type, F(2, 442)=.34, p=.71, ɳ2p = .002, and no three way interaction between item type,
delay one, and delay two, F(6, 442)= .3, p=.74, ɳ2p = .001.
There were no group differences in the misinformation effects for contradictory or
additive misinformation items.

Phantom ROC. We analyzed the data by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas and Lampinen, we used the Solver add-in to Excel to
obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated with the model.
The best fitting ROC curves are shown in Figures 6-9 and parameter estimates for the model are
shown in Table 3. Overall, the models provided an excellent fit, accounting for 99.4% of the
variance for the long-long condition, 99.8% of the variance for the long-short condition, 99.2%
of the variance for the short-long condition, and 99.8% of the variance for the short-short
condition.

38

Short-Short Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately
2% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 16% of the time. For
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 40% of the time and phantom
recollection was used 21% of the time.
Short-Long Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately
7% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 16% of the time. For
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 35% of the time and phantom
recollection was used 17% of the time.
Long-Short Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately
0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. For
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 40% of the time and phantom
recollection was used 15% of the time.
Long-Long Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately
0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. For
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 48% of the time and phantom
recollection was used 15% of the time.
Overall. For additive items, recollection rejection rates did not differ across conditions
but phantom recollection rates decreased when the first delay was long (0%, 0%) instead of short
(16%, 16%). For contradictory items, recollection rejection rates were highest in the longest
delay condition, long-long, and lowest in the short-long delay condition. For contradictory items,
phantom recollection rates did not differ across delay conditions.

39

40

41

Table Three.
Parameters
Short-Short
c1
c2
4.43 1.47
Short-Long
c1
c2
5.48 1.43
Long-Short
c1
c2
1.84 1.36
Long-Long
c1
c2
1.51 1.12

Additive Items

Contradictory Items

c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
1.01 0.89 0.66 0.15 -0.42 0.01
0.16 0.29
0.40
0.21 0.11
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
1.14 1.03 0.69 0.22 -0.34 0.06
0.16 0.57
0.35
0.17
0
c3

c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
1 0.91 0.64 0.13 -0.57
0
0.08 0.38
0.41
0.15 0.47

c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
0.84 0.78 0.62 0.11 -0.34
0
0 0.49
0.48
0.15 0.5

Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=2.63,
SD=1.43) and RA2 (M=2.85, SD=1.49) was r(239) = .90, p<.001. On unrelated items, the
agreement between RA1 (M=.48, SD=.65) and RA2 (M=.61, SD=.75) was r(239)=.83, p<.001.
On contradictory items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.69, SD=.96) and RA2 (M=1.72,
SD=.97) was r(239)=.94, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1 (M=.46,
SD=.67) and RA2 (M=.52, SD=.67) was r(239)=.89, p<.001.
Short-Short Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 61%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 19%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 17%.
Short-Long Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 64%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.
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Long-Short Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 16%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 16%.
Long-Long Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 9%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 20%.
Overall. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 58%.
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 15%. The self-reported rate
of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.
In order to determine the effects of item type and delay on self-reported rates of
recollection rejection, a 3 (item: contradictory, additive, unrelated) x 2 (delay one: short, long) x
2 (delay two: short, long) ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item
type, F (2, 444) = 204.75, p<.001, ɳ2p = .48. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants
reported using recollection rejection more for contradictory items (M=.58, SE=.02) than additive
items (M=.15, SE=.01) and unrelated items (M=.18, SE=.02), p’s<.001. There was not a
significant difference in self-reported recollection rejection for additive and unrelated items.
There was a main effect of the first delay, F (1, 222) = 4.72, p=.031, ɳ2p = .02. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that participants whose first delay was short (M=.32, SE=.01) reported
more recollection rejection than participants whose first delay was long (M=.38, SE=.02),
p=.031. No other results were significant at p<.05.
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Discussion
In this study, I manipulated the delay that participants received before and after they
received misinformation. Misinformation effects were found for contradictory and additive
misinformation item types, replicating the results found in the pilot study. The finding that
additive misinformation was accepted more than contradictory misinformation was also
replicated in this study.
The main manipulation in this study, delay, was not significant. It was hypothesized that
participants would be less accurate when delays were longer and that they would be less likely to
use recollection rejection. Participants’ accuracy, however, did not vary with delays. One
explanation for this is that the delays used were not long enough or different enough from one
another. The experiment was constrained to a one hour time block, which constrained the longest
delay times that we could use to two 14 minute delays. These delays seem relatively short in
comparison to the delays in reporting a crime that may occur in real life (e.g., hours or days). In
comparison, our short delay times were 2 minutes apiece. This means that the difference between
the long-long delay condition and the short-short delay condition was 24 minutes. I thought that
this time difference would be enough to elicit differences in accuracy scores, but this was not
found to be true.
Almost all research on the misinformation effect involves delays both before and after
receiving postevent information. While the length of the delay period varies across studies,
almost no one has directly examined the effects of manipulating delay on the acceptance of
misinformation. Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, and Winfry (1992) examined the effects of
manipulating the delay between receiving postevent information and taking the final test. They
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had a short delay (15 minutes) and a long delay (5-7 days). The researchers found that memory
was more impaired when the test was delayed 5-7 days than when it was taken 15 minutes after
receiving postevent information. Belli et al. (1992) did find an effect of delay but their delay
manipulation was much stronger than ours. However, if we had manipulated the delay time
across hours or days, I would expect that recollection rejection rates would decrease with a
longer delay between postevent information and the test.
Experiment Two: Warning Study
In many recollection rejection studies, instructions about the use of recollection rejection
have been provided to participants (Brainerd et al., 2003). Instructing participants about the
exclusivity of items and the ability to use recollection rejection approximately doubles the use of
recollection rejection (Rotello et al. 2000). In these studies, participants in the control condition
who did not receive instructions used recollection rejection 13-14% of the time, whereas
participants in the instruction condition used recollection rejection nearly 30% of the time.
In most recollection rejection studies, words are presented and participants are tested over
studied words, related words that were not studied, and unrelated words that were not studied.
Instructions introducing recollection rejection are presented to alert participants to the fact that
there are item categories or that original information is somewhat exclusive from the postevent
information. For example, in the traditional recollection rejection studies, participants may know
that they did not hear the word ‘ball’ if they saw a picture of a ‘ball’ because the experimenter
informed them that the item would be presented either as a word or a picture. In the
misinformation paradigm, there are two sources that a piece of information could have come
from: event and postevent information. When a piece of postevent information contradicts a
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piece of information from the original event, the participant may believe that the two pieces of
information are exclusive (i.e., that the postevent information is wrong).
Warnings have been used in misinformation studies to reduce the acceptance of false
postevent information (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Tousignant et al. 1986; Christiaansen &
Ochalek, 1983). Greene et al. (1982) warned participants of misinformation in an attempt to get
them to resist accepting misinformation on a final test. The researchers manipulated the
placement of the warning: before the slides, before the postevent information, before the test, or
no warning. In these misinformation warning studies, an explanation for why the source of the
postevent information may be inaccurate is provided. In the first misinformation warning study,
the researchers told participants that the police cadet who wrote the report “was inexperienced at
detailing observed crimes, some of the information…may be inaccurate” (Greene et al. 1982;
p.210). The researchers measured the time it took participants to read the postevent information
as well as accuracy on the final memory test to assess the effect of the warnings. In comparison
to people who did not receive a warning, people who received a warning between the event and
the postevent information took longer to read sentences containing false information. People who
received warnings immediately before the slides or immediately before the final test read
sentences at the same rate as people who did not receive a warning. In Experiment 1, the
researchers found that people warned before the postevent information were marginally more
accurate on the final memory test than people who were not warned. A second experiment was
conducted to replicate these findings. In the second study, warnings placed just before the
postevent information led to significantly greater accuracy on the final memory test in
comparison to people who did not receive a warning. This finding was later replicated by other
researchers (Chambers & Zaragoza, 2001). It is important to note, however, that the warning
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used by Greene et al. (1982) and warnings used in other research did not restore memory
performance to levels of the control group who received no false information.
Warnings placed before the postevent information decrease the source monitoring and
misinformation acceptance portions of the misinformation effect by increasing discrepancy
detection. Therefore, successful recollection rejection rates should increase when participants are
warned.
I was interested in measuring the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation
paradigm, so I tested the effects of a misinformation warning with specific instructions about
recollection rejection on misinformation acceptance. Providing instructions to participants should
alter peoples’ strategy, causing them to scrutinize postevent information more carefully, thereby
increasing the chance that discrepancy detection will occur and recollection rejection will be
used to reject false information.
Method
Participants
One hundred and seventy-nine general psychology students from the University of
Arkansas participated for course credit. Participants who indicated that they knew that the study
was about the misinformation effect were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally
knew the subject of the slide show were also excluded from analyses. Five participants indicated
knowledge about the study or recognized the subject of the slide show. This left us with one
hundred and seventy-four participants. The sample was predominately Caucasian (84.3%, 3.5%
African American, 5.23% Hispanic, 6.98% Asian, 1.16% Bi-racial), 66.9% female, and the
average age was 19.57 years (SD=1.88, Range=18-29).
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Design
The study was a 3 (item type: foil, additive, contradictory) x 3 (warning: no warning,
warning, warning + recollection rejection instructions) mixed factorial design with and warning
as a between subjects factor. The materials for this study were the same as the materials for the
pilot study with the addition of a warning.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory
for normal everyday events. Participants gave consent to participate before the study began.
Participants were shown a slide show. Afterwards, participants completed a 14 minute filler task.
Before reading a narrative about the slide show, participants in the warning conditions were
warned about inaccurate details in the narrative. Participants were then given a narrative about
the slide show to read that was “written by a police officer”. Once they finished reading the
narrative, participants performed another 14 minute filler task. After the filler, participants in the
warning condition were reminded of possibility of inaccurate details in the narrative. Participants
in the warning and recollection rejection instruction condition received a description of
recollection rejection as well as an example of how it could be used. Participants then completed
an old/new recognition test. Prior to recognition test administration, the experimenter instructed
the participant on how to complete the test.
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Results
Data Analysis
For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items,
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded. The data was analyzed using a 3 (critical
items: unrelated items, contradictory items, and additive items) x 3 (warning: no warning,
warning, warning and recollection rejection instructions) mixed factorial ANOVA to determine
the effects of items type and warnings. The confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit
using the phantom ROC model. Confidence data was plotted so that ROC curves could be fit to
them. The model was compared to self-report data. According to dual process theory, the ROC
curves should be deflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection is occurring. Since
recollection rejection can be used for contradictory misinformation, we expected the ROC curve
to be deflected below the diagonal for contradictory misinformation ROC curves. Since
recollection rejection cannot be used for additive misinformation, we did not expect the ROC
curve to be deflected below the diagonal for additive misinformation ROC curves. The selfreport data was coded by two RAs to obtain an inter-rater reliability score. I was primarily
interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of these studies so those are the only selfreport analyses reported in this manuscript.
Misinformation Effects. Data from the misinformation results are presented in Figure 10.
In order to analyze misinformation effects and the effects of warnings, a 3 (item: unrelated,
contradictory, additive) x 3 (warning: no warning, warning, warning + RR) ANOVA was
conducted. The ANOVA on these scores revealed a main effect of item type, F (2, 340) = 16.74,
p<.001, ɳ2p = .09. Pairwise comparisons revealed that unrelated item accuracy was significantly
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higher than additive item accuracy, p<.001. This finding reveals that there was a misinformation
effect for the additive misinformation. Pairwise comparisons revealed that unrelated item
accuracy was significantly higher than contradictory item accuracy, p=.002. Therefore, there was
a misinformation effect for both additive and contradictory items.
I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than
contradictory misinformation acceptance because contradictory items are more conducive to the
use of recollection rejection Pairwise comparisons revealed that contradictory item accuracy was
significantly higher than additive item accuracy, p=.002.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of warning on accuracy, F (2, 170) =3.38, p=.036, ɳ2p
= .038 and an interaction between warning and item type, F (4, 340) =2.94, p=.027, ɳ2p =.033.
Pairwise comparisons using LSD test revealed that the control condition (M=.7, SE=.02) was less
accurate the warning condition (M=.78, SE=.03) and the warning plus recollection rejection
instructions condition (M=.78, SE=.03), p=.023, p=.033. The two warning conditions did not
differ from one another on overall accuracy.
In order to examine the item x warning interaction one way ANOVAs were conducted for
each item type. The one way ANOVA on unrelated items was not significant, F (2, 171) = 1.98,
p=.14, ɳ2p =.023. The one way ANOVA on additive items was not significant, F (2, 171) = 2.11,
p=.13, ɳ2p =.024. The one way ANOVA on the contradictory items was significant, F (2, 171) =
5.04, p=.007, ɳ2p =.056. Posthoc tests using LSD test revealed that accuracy on the contradictory
items was significantly higher in the warning + RR instructions conditions (M=.83, SE=.04) than
the control condition (M=.67, SE=.03). The fact that the warning + RR instructions improved
performance on the contradictory items suggests that the instructions about the use of
recollection rejection may have increased the use of recollection rejection.
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In order to examine the differences in misinformation effects for contradictory items
across warning conditions a one way ANOVA was conducted on contradictory item difference
scores. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the unrelated item accuracy from the
contradictory item accuracy because this reflects the misinformation effect. The one way
ANOVA on contradictory item difference score was significant, F(2, 170)= 5.29, p=.006.
Posthoc using LSD test revealed that there was a smaller misinformation effect in the warning +
RR condition (M=.04, SD=.38) compared to the control condition (M= -.17, SD=.38), p=.002.
Posthoc tests also revealed that the misinformation effect in the warning + RR condition (M=.04,
SD=.38) was significantly smaller than the misinformation effect in the warning condition (M= .13, SD=.32), p=.021.
In order to examine the differences in misinformation effects for additive items across
warning conditions, a one way ANOVA was conducted on additive item difference scores. The
difference score was calculated by subtracting the unrelated item accuracy from the additive item
accuracy because this reflects the misinformation effect. The one way ANOVA on the additive
item difference score was not significant.
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Phantom ROC. We analyzed the data by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas and Lampinen, we used the Solver add-in to Excel to
obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated with the model.
The best fitting ROC curves are shown in Figures 11-13 and parameter estimates for the model
are shown in Table 4. Overall, the model provided an excellent fit, accounting for 99.5% of the
variance in the control condition, 99.91% of the variance in the warning condition, and 99.88%
of the variance in the warning + RR condition.
Control Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 0%
of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 17% of the time. For contradictory
items, recollection rejection was used approximately 41% of the time and phantom recollection
was used 31% of the time.
Warning Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 3%
of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. For contradictory
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items, recollection rejection was used approximately 52% of the time and phantom recollection
was used 20% of the time.
Warning + RR Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used
approximately 0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time.
For contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 41% of the time and
phantom recollection was used 10% of the time.
Overall. For additive items, recollection rejection rates did not differ much across groups;
however, phantom recollection was used 17% of the time in the control condition but estimates
of phantom recollection decreased to 0% in the warning conditions. For contradictory items,
recollection rejection rates were highest in the warning condition (52%) but this difference is
likely not significant from the 41% measured in the control and warning + RR condition.
Phantom recollection decreased with condition (control = 31%, warning = 20%, warning + RR =
10%). For both types of misinformation, phantom recollection decreased with warnings but
recollection rejection rates did not appear to be affected by warnings.
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Table Four.
Parameters
Control
c1
c2
c3
2.24 1.33 1.04
Warning
c1
c2
c3
4.4 1.66 1.17
Warning + RR
c1
c2
c3
1.91 1.24 0.92

Additive Items

Contradictory Items

c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
0.95 0.758 0.14
-0.5
0
0.17 0.37
0.41
0.31 0.57
c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
1.11 0.867 0.224 -0.54
0.03
0.06 0.44
0.52
0.20 0.83
c4
c5
c6
c7
RR
PhR
d'
RR
PhR
d'
0.84 0.572 0.068 -0.58
0
0 0.32
0.41
0.10 -0.05

Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=2.6, SD=1.44)
and RA2 (M=3, SD=1.63) was r(179) = .84, p< .001. On unrelated items, the agreement between
RA1 (M=.53, SD=.68) and RA2 (M=.7, SD=.77) was r(179)=.76, p<.001. On contradictory
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items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.69, SD=.96) and RA2 (M=1.7, SD=.97) was
r(179)=.93, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1 (M=.39, SD=.58) and RA2
(M=.6, SD=.71) was r(179)=.73, p<.001.
Control Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items
was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 13%. The selfreported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.
Warning Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 55%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.
Warning+RR Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory
items was 62%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 23%.
Overall. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 56%.
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 13%. The self-reported rate
of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 20%.
In order to determine the effects of item type and delays on self-reported rates of
recollection rejection a 3 (item: contradictory, additive, unrelated) x 3 (feedback: no warning,
warning, warning + RR) ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item
type, F (2, 342) = 171.87, p<.001, ɳ2p = .5. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants
reported using recollection rejection more for contradictory items (M=.57, SE=.02) than additive
items (M=.13, SE=.02) and unrelated items (M=.2, SE=.02), p’s<.001. Pairwise comparisons
revealed that participants reported using recollection rejection more for unrelated items (M=.2,
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SE=.02) than for additive items (M=.13, SE=.02), p=.009. There was no effect of feedback, F (1,
171) = 1.75, p=.18, ɳ2p = .02. There was no interaction between the item type and warning, F (4,
342) = .59, p=.67, ɳ2p = .007.
Discussion
I was interested in the effects that warnings and instructions about the use of recollection
rejection would have on the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm. The
findings of this study replicated the results of the previous studies in that misinformation effects
were established, contradictory misinformation acceptance was lower than additive
misinformation acceptance, and recollection rejection was used to reject false information.
However, my findings on warnings do not replicate previous research. In this study, only
the warning in the warning plus recollection rejection instructions condition significantly
reduced the misinformation effect. Simply warning participants in the warning-only condition
failed to significantly reduce the misinformation effect. This finding contradicts the findings of
Greene et al. (1982) who found that the misinformation effect was reduced when participants
were only warned about misleading information before encountering it. There are a few
explanations for my discrepant findings. Greene et al. (1982) used a multiple choice recognition
test whereas I used an old/new recognition test. On Greene’s test, participants were faced with
three choices when confronted with critical items; the choices were a) what they saw in the slide
show, b) the piece of misinformation, or c) a piece of novel information. On my test, participants
were faced with one choice when confronted with critical items: to endorse the misinformation
or not. It is possible that after receiving a warning that it was easier to recognize the false details
and refute them by selecting an alternative on Greene’s test whereas on my test participants
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could only recognize the false details. Secondly, participants partook in two 14 minute long filler
tasks in my study, whereas Greene used two 5 minute filler tasks. Perhaps this amount of time
allowed participants to forget more about what they had seen in the slide show, making it even
harder to reject the false information on the final test. Finally, Greene et al.’s warning differed
from mine in that Greene provided an explanation as to why there were inaccurate details in the
story participants were about to read. Similar to Greene’s study, participants in my study were
told that the summary they were about to read was written by a police officer. In Greene’s study,
participants were told that “because the police cadet was inexperienced at detailing observed
crimes, some of the information in the paragraph may be (have been) inaccurate” whereas in my
study participants were told that “you should know that the summary contains some inaccurate
details.” Could it be that the lack of explanation for the inaccurate details made participants
question the existence of or extent of the inaccuracies in the summary?
There was a decreased misinformation effect for the warning + RR condition. The
difference between this condition and the warning condition were the instructions about the
potential to use recollection rejection on the test. “You may be able to reject some of these
inaccurate details by comparing what you saw in the slide show to other details when only one or
the other could have occurred. For example, if you saw the man arrive at the house in a taxi and
the test asked if he drove a car, you could reject the idea that he drove a car because you know he
arrived in a taxi.” Sticking with the lack of explanation for inaccurate details hypothesis, these
instructions could have provided participants with a reason why the inaccurate details occurred.
With regards to the phantom recollection model and self-report results, I had expected to
see increased rates of recollection rejection when participants were warned about misleading
details. Unfortunately, this was not the case for either form of measurement. Instead, what we
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found using the phantom ROC model was that phantom recollection rates decreased for both
additive and contradictory information in both warning conditions.
One reason why recollection rejection rates may not have increased in the warning
conditions could be due to the placement of the warning. Participants were warned right before
they encountered the misleading details, which may have caused participants not to incorporate
misleading details information into memory in the first place - a process known as discrepancy
detection. If misinformation acceptance was reduced by discrepancy detection, it could prevent
an increase in recollection rejection rates because by the time recollection rejection could have
occurred (at test), discrepancy detection (at the time postevent information is encountered) may
have already taken place.
A second reason why recollection rejection rates may not have increased with the
warning conditions could be that participants were already using recollection rejection as much
as possible in the control condition. Our item types made the use of recollection rejection
particularly easy in that our items were semantically related (i.e., Coke vs. Pepsi instead of Coke
vs. apple or Coke vs. dog). Previous research has shown that when items are highly semantically
related, recollection rejection is more likely to occur (Odegard, Lampinen, & Toglia, 2005).
General Discussion
Misinformation
The primary aim of these studies was to examine the use of recollection rejection in the
misinformation paradigm but these studies also provide some new evidence about the
misinformation paradigm itself. In all three of my studies, I found that participants accepted
additive misinformation more than contradictory misinformation. A previous study found that
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participants accepted more additive than contradictory misinformation after a one week delay
(Frost, 2000) but to my knowledge mine are the first studies to demonstrate that participants
accepted more additive misinformation than contradictory misinformation without a lengthy
delay (which is how most misinformation studies are conducted). One previous study
contradicted these results; however, Nemeth and Belli (2006) found that the acceptance of
additive and contradictory misinformation did not differ for schemata knowledge. There are now
four studies supporting the finding that additive misinformation is accepted significantly more
than contradictory misinformation and only one which did not find support for this hypothesis.
The study that did not find support for this hypothesis measured schemata knowledge in
comparison to the other studies which measured memory for events. There may be something
specific about schemata knowledge that eliminates the effect of rejecting more contradictory
misinformation than additive misinformation. In addition, there is little theoretical basis to
support the idea that additive and contradictory misinformation rates should be the same. Indeed,
even Nemeth and Belli were surprised by the lack of difference in acceptance of additive and
contradictory misinformation in their studies. They cited the short retention interval as a potential
reason for their lack of findings; however, my research calls that explanation into question. In
addition to this there is support for the hypothesis that additive misinformation should be
accepted at higher rates than contradictory misinformation. Generally supporting this idea is the
fact that there is already something specific in memory that can be used to reject contradictory
misinformation. Specifically supporting this idea, there is proof for the use of memory editing
strategies, such as recollection rejection, on contradictory misinformation but not so much for
additive misinformation. Future research on this matter is required in order to be able to
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generalize the finding that additive misinformation is accepted more than contradictory
misinformation.
There are important implications, for research in the misinformation paradigm, to draw
from the differences in the acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation. In the over
40 years of misinformation research, some studies have elicited the misinformation effect using
contradictory misinformation (Loftus, 1978; Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996) and others
have elicited the misinformation effect using additive misinformation (Lane & Zaragoza, 1995;
Loftus, 1975; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996). In particular these two types of misinformation have
not been treated as though they are different. Few publications have discussed the implications of
using additive versus contradictory misinformation on the size of misinformation effects or there
relation to actual eyewitness memory. Meta-analyses on misinformation studies should take the
type of misinformation used in each study into account. In addition to this other researchers
should take the type of misinformation used in other studies into account before comparing the
results of their studies to others or before comparing the results two of separate studies.
Recollection Rejection
The finding that additive misinformation is accepted more than contradictory
misinformation provides support that the higher rates of recollection rejection for contradictory
items, as evidenced by the self-report results and the pROC model for my studies, caused the
discrepancy in acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation. It would appear that the
use of recollection rejection on contradictory misinformation lead the rates of contradictory
misinformation acceptance to decrease.
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It is important to point out that although the manipulations in my studies did not push
around rates of recollection rejection that I did find consistent evidence for recollection rejection
through three different measures in my studies. Across all three studies I found that participants
accepted additive misinformation less than contradictory misinformation. While this does not
provide direct evidence for the use of recollection rejection it does provide evidence that
participants may have extra strategies available to them to reject contradictory misinformation in
comparison to additive misinformation. In addition to this, I found evidence that participants
self-reported the use of recollection rejection for contradictory misinformation more than for
additive misinformation and that participants self-reported recollection rejection for additive
misinformation no more than for unrelated items. Finally, the pROC curves for each of these
studies indicated that participants used recollection rejection for contradictory misinformation.
All together these measures provide solid evidence that people use recollection rejection when
recollecting event details and in particular when misleading event details have an exclusive true
detail that corresponds to them.
These data provide insight into the role of recollection rejection in remembering events.
One conclusion to draw from this research is that people use recollection rejection to reject false
suggestions about events that they have witnessed. Previous research has established that people
use recollection rejection to reject false suggestions in the form of words, pictures, and for
narratives, but to my knowledge this is the first study to identify recollection rejection in the
memory for events. The phantom ROC model and self-report judgments both identified the use
of recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm. In addition, the misinformation effect
was larger for the additive items than contradictory items as hypothesized, potentially because
contradictory items allow for the use of recollection rejection.
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In Experiment 1, I varied the length of the delays that participants encountered in the
misinformation paradigm. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the effects of short term
delays on misinformation effects have been measured. Fortunately for the years of research on
the misinformation effect that have mostly disregarded the potential for varying delay times to
affect participants’ memory, I did not find an effect of manipulating short term delays on the size
of the misinformation effect. However, this was not the result hypothesized at the outset of this
study. I believe now that the delay lengths were not long enough to identify an effect with the
number of participants in the study, which led to inadequate power to detect differences.
Similarly, I did not detect an effect of varying delays on the use of recollection rejection. I
hypothesized that the reason for this is that the delay manipulation was not strong enough (i.e.,
the difference between delay lengths was not long enough). Previous research has found that
manipulating delays on a larger timescale affects the ability to use recollection rejection, but my
study revealed a diminished effect on shorter timescales (Brainerd, Reyna, and Kneer, 1995).
Future research should examine the effects of delays of varying lengths from hours to days to
establish when exactly delays start to affect misinformation acceptance and the use of
recollection rejection.
In Experiment 2, I introduced warnings about misinformation and instructions about the
ability to use recollection rejection. In past research, warnings about misinformation have
reduced the acceptance of postevent information (Greene et al., 1982). Warnings placed after
postevent information have sometimes been found to reduce the misinformation effect but this
finding has been difficult to replicate. Therefore, I chose to place the warning where it has
previously been effective: before encountering postevent information. Unfortunately, the
warning only effectively reduced misinformation acceptance when accompanied by recollection
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rejection instructions. It may be possible that the recollection rejection instructions provided a
reason for why inaccurate details were present leading participants to reject them whereas in the
warning study participants only received the information that inaccurate details were present
without an explanation. It may have been harder for participants to come to believe that false
information was presented to them without an explanation as to why. Recollection rejection rates
were not increased in the warning-only or warning + RR conditions. Previous research has found
that giving participants instructions about the use of recollection rejection substantially increases
their use of recollection rejection. There are a few reasons why recollection rejection instructions
may not have inflated the use of recollection rejection in my study. One reason why recollection
rejection rates may not have increased is that participants may have already been using
recollection rejection to the best of their ability even before receiving instructions about the use
of recollection rejection. In this case it would make it difficult to increase rates of recollection
rejection. Another explanation is that there may not have been enough participants in the study to
make it possible to detect the differences in the use of recollection rejection across feedback
conditions. Future research should examine the effects of warnings about misinformation and
recollection rejection instructions in order to determine their exact effects in memory for events.
Conclusions
This series of studies examined the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation
paradigm and the differences between the acceptance of additive and contradictory
misinformation. I found that participants use recollection rejection and report using recollection
rejection to reject contradictory misinformation. Participants are also more likely to report
additive misinformation than contradictory misinformation which provides some indication that
recollection rejection may be an extra strategy available for rejecting contradictory
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misinformation. Future research should examine the use of memory editing strategies on event
based memories in order to gain a clearer picture of when they are used and to what extent they
are used.
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Appendix B: Slide Show
Slide One

Slide Two

Contradictory Key Item A

Contradictory Key Item A

Contradictory Key Item B

Contradictory Key Item B

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Slide Three

Slide Four

Slide Five

Contradictory Note Location Item A

Contradictory Note Location Item B

Slide Six

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Contradictory Fruit Item A

Contradictory Fruit Item A

Contradictory Fruit Item B

Contradictory Fruit Item B

Slide Seven

Slide Eight

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Slide Nine

Slide Ten

Slide Eleven

Slide Twelve

Contradictory Soda Item A

Contradictory Soda Item B

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Slide Thirteen

Slide Fourteen

Slide Fifteen

Slide Sixteen

Slide Seventeen

Slide Eighteen

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Slide Nineteen

Slide Twenty

Contradictory Magazine Item A

Contradictory Magazine Item B

Slide Twenty One

Slide Twenty Two

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
76

Slide Twenty Three

Slide Twenty Four

Slide Twenty Five

Slide Twenty Six

Slide Twenty Seven

Contradictory Cap Item A

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Contradictory Cap Item B

Slide Twenty Eight

Slide Twenty Nine

Contradictory Bed Item A

Contradictory Bed Item B

Slide Thirty

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Contradictory Jewelry Item A

Contradictory Jewelry Item A

Contradictory Jewelry Item B

Contradictory Jewelry Item B

Contradictory Jewelry Item 2A

Contradictory Jewelry Item 2A

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Contradictory Jewelry Item 2B

Contradictory Jewelry Item 2B

Slide Thirty One

Slide Thirty Two

Slide Thirty Three

Slide Thirty Four

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Slide Thirty Five

Slide Thirty Six

Slide Thirty Seven

Slide Thirty Eight

Slide Thirty Nine

Slide Forty

Pictures taken by Kara Moore at Dr. James Lampien’s place of residence in Fayetteville, AR on
October 28, 2013.
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Appendix C: Adult Information Form
Adult Information Form
You are participating in the ‘Memory for
Events’ project. Section A asks for your
birthdate. Section B asks you some questions
about you. Section C is to be filled out by the
research assistant on the day you participate.
Please complete the information in Sections A
and B.
Section A. To Be Completed By You

Section B. To Be Completed By You
Are you male or female? __________
How would you describe your
race/ethnicity? ____________________
What languages do you speak?
____________________
Are you a native English speaker? ______

Date of Birth:
Month: ______ Day: ____ Year: _____

Section C. To Be Completed By Research
Assistant
Participant Number: ______________
What condition is the participant in?
__________
Note: Once all sessions are completed,
Section A will be cut away from this form
and shredded to preserve your
confidentiality.
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Appendix D: Critical Item Counterbalance
Narrative 1 & 4
Magazine Unrelated
Tries On Unrelated
Key
Unrelated
Bed
Additive
Note
Location Additive
Fruit
Additive
Soda
Contradictory
Jewelry
Contradictory
Baseball
cap
Contradictory

Narrative 2 & 5
Additive
Additive
Additive
Contradictory

Narrative 3 & 6
Contradictory
Contradictory
Contradictory
Unrelated

Suggested
(N1, 2, 3) A
Time
Ring
Flower Pot
Made

Contradictory
Contradictory
Unrelated
Unrelated

Unrelated
Unrelated
Additive
Additive

Kitchen
Apple
Coca-Cola
Bracelet

Suggested
(N4, 5, 6) B
People
Watch
Doormat
Unmade
Living
Room
Banana
Pepsi
Necklace

Unrelated

Additive

Red

Black
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Appendix E: Narratives
Contradictory items are in bold and Additive items are underlined.
Narrative One
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowner on
the counter in the kitchen. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although being an
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, thinking he was
hungry, he took an apple. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the kitchen but found
nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked
over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and
fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he
helped himself to a Coca-Cola from the fridge. Always curious about the secret lives of his
customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the built-in desk, but
there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided
to pocket them.
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric decided to sit down on the couch. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little
guilty and decided it was time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on
the back door that had been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the
siding back up. Then he knelt down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said
was not working. Once that was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and opened it to examine its contents. He tried on a red cap and checked
his reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back.
Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels.
Eric then headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing
interesting. He examined the bedspread on the nicely made-up bed. He thought he might like to
get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser,
including some jewelry. He picked up a bracelet, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the
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fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle that was on the fireplace mantle with a
black lighter. He sat down on the patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the
wooden coffee table and flicked through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got
up and turned the CD off. He retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out,
Eric decided to have a quick look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some
prescription pills that he thought he might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job,
so Eric hurried to the door and closed it behind him as he left.
Narrative Two
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left
for him from under a flowerpot.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on
the counter in the kitchen. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although being an
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, thinking he was
hungry, he took an apple. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the kitchen but found
nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked
over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and
fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he then looked in the fridge to
see he could find anything to drink. Always curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric
rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t
much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket
them.
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read Time magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it back
on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was time to
get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had been torn
down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt down to
fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that was done,
Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. Eric did not find anything that interested him
there. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric
headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He
examined the bedspread on the nicely made-up bed. He thought he might like to get a bedspread
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like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, including some
jewelry. He found a ring that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed
it behind him as he left.
Narrative Three
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left
for him from under a flowerpot.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house. Eric put his tool box down. Although being an
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He found nothing interesting in the kitchen
cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent
down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once
his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Coca-Cola from
the fridge. Always curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile
of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either.
In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket them.
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by "The Band" that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read Time magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it back
on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was time to
get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had been torn
down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt down to
fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that was done,
Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. He tried on a red cap and checked his reflection
in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back. Next, Eric
looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric headed to the master
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bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He thought he might like
to get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser,
including some jewelry. He picked up a bracelet, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket. He also found a ring that fit him
nicely and slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed
it behind him as he left.
Narrative Four
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on
the end table in the living room. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although
being an electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be
nosy. He walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and,
thinking he was hungry, he took a banana. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the
kitchen but found nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to
work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers
from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he was
feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Pepsi from the fridge. Always curious about the secret
lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the built-in
desk, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and
decided to pocket them.
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric decided to sit down on the couch. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little
guilty and decided it was time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on
the back door that had been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the
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siding back up. Then he knelt down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said
was not working. Once that was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and opened it to examine its contents. He tried on a black cap and
checked his reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it
back. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels.
Eric then headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing
interesting. He examined the bedspread on the unmade bed. He thought he might like to get a
bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser,
including some jewelry. He picked up a necklace, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick knacks on the
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle that was on the fireplace mantle with a
black lighter. He sat down on the patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the
wooden coffee table and flipped through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got
up and turned the CD off. He retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out,
Eric decided to have a quick look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some
prescription pills that he thought he might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job,
so Eric hurried to the door and closed it behind him as he left.
Narrative Five
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left
for him from under a doormat.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on
the end table in the living room. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although
being an electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be
nosy. He walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and,
thinking he was hungry, took a banana. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the
kitchen but found nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to
work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers
from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he then
looked in the fridge to see he could find anything to drink. Always curious about the secret lives
of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen
bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks
and decided to pocket them.
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Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read People magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it
back on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was
time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had
been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt
down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that
was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. Eric did not find anything that interested him
there. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric
headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He
examined the bedspread on the unmade bed. He thought he might like to get a bedspread like
the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, including some
jewelry. He found a watch that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed
it behind him as he left.
Narrative Six
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left
for him from under a doormat.
He unlocked the door and walked into the house. Eric put his tool box down. Although being an
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He found nothing interesting in the kitchen
cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent
down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once
his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Pepsi from the
fridge. Always curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of
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papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In
the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket them.
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by "The Band" that he knew he would enjoy, Eric
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read People magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it
back on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was
time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had
been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt
down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that
was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room.
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. He tried on a black cap and checked his
reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back. Next,
Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric headed to the
master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He thought he
might like to get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on
the dresser, including some jewelry. He picked up a necklace, which he inspected carefully
and—thinking of his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket. He also found a
watch that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket.
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flipped
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed
it behind him as he left.
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Appendix F: Test One
Test for Narratives 1, 2, & 3.
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing your
memory for this video.
Each question has three parts:
1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;
2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer.
3) the third part asks you to explain the reasons for your answer.
Please complete all three steps for every question.

WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE
QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST.
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1) The man read a Time magazine.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

2) There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the
3) fridge.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

4) The bed in the bedroom was made.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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5) The man sat in a patterned chair.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

There was a white microwave on the kitchen
6) counter.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

The man read a note from the homeowners in the
7) kitchen.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

8) The man had blonde hair.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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9)

The man tried on a ring in the bedroom.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

10) The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

11) The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

12) The man stole a bracelet.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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13) The man fixed an electrical socket.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

14) The man ate an apple.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

15) The man looked through a photo album.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

The man wore a white
16) shirt.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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17) The man stole pills from the bathroom.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

18) The man tried on a red cap.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

19) The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

20) There was a treadmill in the living room.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

96

21) The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door
22) frame.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

The man found the key to the door under a flower
23) pot.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

24) The man carried a yellow tool box.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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Appendix G: Test Two
Test for Narratives 4, 5, & 6.
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing your
memory for this video.
Each question has three parts:
1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;
2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer.
3) the third part asks you to explain the reasons for your answer.
Please complete all three steps for every question.

WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE
QUESTIONS, TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BEGIN THE TEST.
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1) The man read a People magazine.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

2) There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

3) The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

4) The bed in the bedroom was unmade.
Yes

Please explain the reasons
for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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5) The man sat in a patterned chair.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

6) There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

7) The man read a note from the
homeowners in the living room.
Yes
No

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

8) The man had blonde hair.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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9)

The man tried on a watch in the bedroom.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

10) The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

11) The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

12) The man stole a necklace.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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13) The man fixed an electrical socket.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

14) The man ate a banana.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

15) The man looked through a photo album.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

16) The man wore a white shirt.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.
No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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17) The man stole pills from the bathroom.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

18) The man tried on a black cap.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

19) The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

20) There was a treadmill in the living room.
Yes

Please explain the reasons for
your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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21) The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

22) The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door
frame.
Yes
No

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

23) The man found the key to the door under a door mat.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident

24) The man carried a yellow tool box.
Yes

Please explain the
reasons for your answer.

No

How confident are you that your answer is correct?
1
Not at all
confident

2
Somewhat
Confident

3
4
Moderately Extremely
Confident
Confident
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Appendix H: Test Keys
Counterbalance One: Test Key
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Item
Unrelated
Target
Contradictory
Additive
Target
Foil
Additive
Foil
Unrelated
Target
Foil
Contradictory
Target
Additive
Target
Target
Target
Contradictory
Target
Foil
Target

22 Target
23 Unrelated
24 Target

Question
The man read a Time magazine.
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge.
The bed in the bedroom was made.
The man sat in a patterned chair.
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.
The man had blonde hair.
The man tried on a ring in the bedroom.
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
The man stole a bracelet.
The man fixed an electrical socket.
The man ate an apple.
The man looked through a photo album.
The man wore a white shirt.
The man stole pills from the bathroom
The man tried on a red cap.
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
There was a treadmill in the living room.
The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door
frame.
The man found the key to the door under a flower pot.
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Counterbalance Two: Test Key
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Item
Additive
Target
Unrelated
Contradictory
Target
Foil
Contradictory
Foil
Additive
Target
Foil
Unrelated
Target
Contradictory
Target
Target
Target
Unrelated
Target
Foil
Foil

22 Target
23 Additive
24 Target

Question
The man read a Time magazine.
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge.
The bed in the bedroom was made.
The man sat in a patterned chair.
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.
The man had blonde hair.
The man tried on a ring in the bedroom.
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
The man stole a bracelet.
The man fixed an electrical socket.
The man ate an apple.
The man looked through a photo album.
The man wore a white shirt.
The man stole pills from the bathroom
The man tried on a red cap.
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
There was a treadmill in the living room.
The man picked up a red coffee mug.
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door
frame.
The man found the key to the door under a flower pot.
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Counterbalance Three: Test Key
#

Item
Contradictory
Target
Additive
Unrelated
Target
Foil
Unrelated
Foil
Contradictory
Target
Foil
Additive
Target
Unrelated
Target
Target
Target
Additive
Target
Foil
Foil

Question
1
The man read a Time magazine.
2
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
3
The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge.
4
The bed in the bedroom was made.
5
The man sat in a patterned chair.
6
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
7
The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.
8
The man had blonde hair.
9
The man tried on a ring in the bedroom.
10
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
11
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
12
The man stole a bracelet.
13
The man fixed an electrical socket.
14
The man ate an apple.
15
The man looked through a photo album.
16
The man wore a white shirt.
17
The man stole pills from the bathroom
18
The man tried on a red cap.
19
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
20
There was a treadmill in the living room.
21
The man picked up a red coffee mug.
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door
22 Target
frame.
23 Contradictory The man found the key to the door under a flower pot.
24 Target
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Counterbalance Four: Test Key
#

Item
Unrelated
Target
Contradictory
Additive
Target
Foil

Question
1
The man read a People magazine.
2
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
3
The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge.
4
The bed in the bedroom was unmade.
5
The man sat in a patterned chair.
6
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living
7 Additive
room.
8 Foil
The man had blonde hair.
9 Unrelated
The man tried on a watch in the bedroom.
10 Target
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
11 Foil
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
12 Contradictory The man stole a necklace.
13 Target
The man fixed an electrical socket.
14 Additive
The man ate a banana.
15 Target
The man looked through a photo album.
16 Target
The man wore a white shirt.
17 Target
The man stole pills from the bathroom
18 Contradictory The man tried on a black cap.
19 Target
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
20 Foil
There was a treadmill in the living room.
21 Foil
The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
22 Target
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame.
23 Unrelated
The man found the key to the door under a door mat.
24 Target
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Counterbalance Five: Test Key
#

Item
Additive
Target
Unrelated
Contradictory
Target
Foil

Question
1
The man read a People magazine.
2
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
3
The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge.
4
The bed in the bedroom was unmade.
5
The man sat in a patterned chair.
6
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living
7 Contradictory room.
8 Foil
The man had blonde hair.
9 Additive
The man tried on a watch in the bedroom.
10 Target
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
11 Foil
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
12 Unrelated
The man stole a necklace.
13 Target
The man fixed an electrical socket.
14 Contradictory The man ate a banana.
15 Target
The man looked through a photo album.
16 Target
The man wore a white shirt.
17 Target
The man stole pills from the bathroom
18 Unrelated
The man tried on a black cap.
19 Target
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
20 Foil
There was a treadmill in the living room.
21 Foil
The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
22 Target
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame.
23 Additive
The man found the key to the door under a door mat.
24 Target
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Counterbalance Six: Test Key
#

Item
Contradictory
Target
Additive
Unrelated
Target
Foil

Question
1
The man read a People magazine.
2
There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter.
3
The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge.
4
The bed in the bedroom was unmade.
5
The man sat in a patterned chair.
6
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter.
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living
7 Unrelated
room.
8 Foil
The man had blonde hair.
9 Contradictory The man tried on a watch in the bedroom.
10 Target
The man listened to a CD by "The Band".
11 Foil
The man stole a credit card from a drawer.
12 Additive
The man stole a necklace.
13 Target
The man fixed an electrical socket.
14 Unrelated
The man ate a banana.
15 Target
The man looked through a photo album.
16 Target
The man wore a white shirt.
17 Target
The man stole pills from the bathroom
18 Additive
The man tried on a black cap.
19 Target
The man lit a candle with a black lighter.
20 Foil
There was a treadmill in the living room.
21 Foil
The man picked up a blue coffee mug.
22 Target
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame.
23 Contradictory The man found the key to the door under a door mat.
24 Target
The man carried a yellow tool box.
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Answer
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Appendix I: Self Report Survey
1) Did you recognize the man in the video? If so, in what way (i.e., ‘I’ve seen him around’
or ‘We’re friends’)?

2) Were you at all suspicious about being tricked during the study? If so, please explain and
indicate when such suspicions took place.

3) Did you know about the misinformation effect prior to participating in this study?

4) If you answered yes to question 3, please briefly describe the misinformation effect.

5) If you answered yes to question 3, were you aware that this study was about the
misinformation effect before we told you?
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Appendix J: Warning Scripts
Warning
Now, I am going have you answer some questions about the video you saw earlier. You may
remember me telling you earlier that some of the details in the narrative were inaccurate. Keep
this in mind when answering questions on the test. Respond according to what you saw in video.
Make sure to read the instructions at the top of the page before beginning and complete every
step asked of you. Please, try to be as accurate as possible.
Warning + RR
Now, I am going have you answer some questions about the video you saw earlier. You may
remember me telling you earlier that some of the details in the narrative were inaccurate. You
may be able to reject some of these inaccurate details by comparing what you saw in the video to
other details when only one or the other could have occurred. For example, if you had seen the
man arrive at the house in a taxi and the test asked if he drove a car you could reject the idea that
he drove a car because you know he arrived in a taxi. Keep this in mind when answering
questions on the test. Respond according to what you saw in video. Make sure to read the
instructions at the top of the page before beginning and complete every step asked of you. Please,
try to be as accurate as possible.
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